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The Forty-Two Hundred Dollar Question: "May State Agencies

Have Discretion in Setting Civil Penalties Under the North
Carolina Constitution?"
In North Carolina more than thirty state agencies possess statutory authority to assess civil penalties, and many have discretion over the amount charged.'
North Carolina courts have held that the authority to establish the amount of a
penalty is judicial in nature.2 As such, this discretion appears to violate the separation of powers clause of the North Carolina Constitution, 3 which requires that
"the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers ... be forever separate

and distinct from each other."' 4 The state constitution does provide, however,
that judicial power may be vested in an administrative agency "as may be reasonably necessary as incident to the purposes for which the agencies were created. ' 5 Thus, whether an agency may hold judicial power, such as the discretion
to set the amount of penalties, ultimately rests in the reasonable necessity of that
power in fulfilling the agency's statutory objectives.
When assessments of civil penalties are challenged, few of the contestants
proffer constitutional theories as the basis of their objections. 6 Agency discretion
in setting penalty amounts did face a test of constitutionality when brought to
the attention of the North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Appeal from Civil
Penalties.7 In In re Appeal the court held valid the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development's (NRCD) ability to set the amount of
penalties for violations of the Sedimentation and Pollution Control Act8 under
article IV of the state constitution. The North Carolina Supreme Court had not
addressed the validity of flexible fines since 1968 in State ex rel Lanier v. Vines, 9
1. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-126(d) (1989) (Coastal Resources Commission granted
power to assess fines up to $250 for minor violations and up to $2500 for major violations); id.§ 125-

2(6) (1986) (Department of Cultural Resources given power to fix reasonable penalties for damage or
failure to return books or other material to library); id § 143-151 (1987) (Commissioner of Insurance granted power to fine up to $1000 penalty for each violation of the Code for Manufactured
Homes, maximum not to exceed $1,000,000 per year); see also New Brief for the State at app., In re

Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989) (No. 543A88) (list of state agencies
with civil penalty authority).
2. See State ex reL Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 495, 164 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1968). Discussing
a statute granting the Commissioner of Insurance power to assess a penalty, the Lanier court said,
"[A]pplication of the law ...so as to make the penalty commensurate with the conduct of the agent
in question is of the essence of judicial power." Id. at 496, 164 S.E.2d at 167; see also 1AM. JUR. 2D
Administrative Law § 173 (1962) (discussing the judicial nature of the power to decide and pronounce judgments).
3. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6.
4. Id.
5. Id. art. IV, § 3.
6. See, eg., Pamlico Marine Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural Resources, 80 N.C. App.
201, 341 S.E.2d 108 (1986) (appeal from $250 penalty for violation of the Coastal Area Management
Act claiming permit requirement not applicable to fact situation); State ex rel Grimsley v.
Buchanan, 64 N.C. App. 367, 307 S.E.2d 384 (1983) (challenge to penalty for violation of the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act claiming lack of effective administrative remedy).
7. 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-64(a)(2) (1983) (amended 1989).
9. 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968).
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when the court examined the reasonable necessity of the Commissioner of Insurance's power to impose a penalty varying from a nominal sum to $25,000.10 In
re Appeal is significant because it updates the judiciary's view of the role that
varying penalties play in modem law enforcement in consideration of the limits
imposed on the discretion to set those penalties. While In re Appeal does not
establish the constitutionality of every state statute permitting flexible fines, it
limits the scope of Lanier and establishes guidelines for determining when administrative discretion is reasonably necessary and thus constitutional.
This Note examines the logic supporting In re Appeal in light of case history and policy concerns. It discusses one possible rationale for limiting the
Lanier holding and expresses concerns about expanding the reasonable necessity
of varying penalties. The Note concludes that although In re Appeal is a needed
aid in defining the constitutionality of many administrative penalties, its holding
may leave the validity of many statutes in question.
In 1983 real estate developers Dennis Harris, Natalie Harris, and Roy Hall
subdivided eighteen acres of land in Caldwell County without taking the sedimentation control measures required by statute.1 1 An NRCD inspection resulted in the issuance of a Notice of Violation, which warned that the
department could impose a civil penalty if the developers did not correct the
violations. 12 The department issued the notice in accordance with a North Carolina statute that gives the Commissioner of the NRCD authority to assess penalties of "not more than one hundred dollars" 13 for violations of the
Sedimentation Pollution Control Act. The statute also allows the Commissioner
to consider each day of continuing violation as a separate violation.14
In January 1984 the NRCD assessed against the developers a civil penalty
of seventy-five dollars a day for fifty-six days covering a period from mid-October to mid-December 1983, totalling $4,200.15 In October 1985 an NRCD hear16
ing officer affirmed the penalty and demanded payment from the developers.

The developers appealed the officer's decision to superior court. They claimed
the agency lacked jurisdiction to fine Hall because it had not notified him of the
violation. 17 They also claimed the penalty was "arbitrary and excessive." 18 The
developers did not argue that the statute granting the NRCD power to assess the
size of the penalty was unconstitutional, but only disputed the reasonableness of
the penalty amount. The superior court did not specifically address either of the
10. Id. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 167-68.
11. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 375, 379 S.E.2d at 31-32.
12. Id One means of preventing sedimentation pollution is to create a natural or artificial
buffer around the area being developed. The court considered inadequate the defendants' attempt to
prevent sedimentation with hay bales after being notified of their violation. Record at 9-11, In re
Appeal (No. 543A88).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-64(a)(1) (1983) (amended 1989). The 1989 amendment raised the
$100 per day limit on penalties to $500 per day. Id. § 113A-64(a)(1) (1989).

14. Id. § 113A-64(a)(1) (1989).
15.
16.
17.
18.

In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 375, 379 S.E.2d at 32.
Id.
Record at 20.
Id at 18.
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developers' contentions, but chose instead to base its judgment on a constitutional objection that apparently was not asserted in the pleadings.1 9 The court
vacated the penalty on the ground that the NRCD had absolute discretion to
establish the amount of the fine in violation of Article I section 3 of the North
20
Carolina Constitution.
Although it rejected the trial court's "absolute discretion" rationale, a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the superior court's
decision. 21 Instead, the majority followed Lanier and held that the state constitution "does not permit an administrative agency to assess a civil penalty whose
amount varies with any agency discretion."' 22 The Lanier decision prohibited the
Commissioner of Insurance from exercising discretion to set penalties up to
$25,00023 and, according to the court of appeals, determined "the constitutionality of any agency penalty whose amount varied in the discretion of the
agency." 24 The court of appeals realized its decision might create a undesirable
result, stating that:
While we agree that Lanier, a twenty-year-old case, may not express
the "modem" view of an agency's exercise of judicial powers, Lanier
controls the result in this case.... We agree the long term enforcement of the Act would be better served by our Supreme Court's overturning Lanier than by our drawing questionable distinctions which
25
Lanier has in any event rejected in advance.

Nevertheless, because the court of appeals considered itself obliged to follow a
strict interpretation of Lanier, it affirmed the lower court's holding that the penalty was unconstitutional. 26 Judge Becton dissented, arguing Lanier did not hold
that the power to impose "a varying penalty offends our Constitution in all circumstances." 27 Judge Becton read Lanier to mandate a case-by-case analysis of
28
discretionary penalties.
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with Judge Becton that prior
precedent did not invalidate all discretionary agency penalties. 2 9 The NRCD's
judicial power, the court found, was reasonably necessary considering the
agency's purpose, the range of discretion granted, and the guidelines that accompanied the discretion. 30 The supreme court did not overturn Lanier as the court
of appeals recommended. Rather, the supreme court confined Lanier strictly to
19. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 92 N.C. App. 1, 6, 370 S.E.2d 572,. 575 (1988), rev'd, 324
N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
20. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 375-76, 379 S.E.2d at 32.
21. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 92 N.C. App. 1, 10, 373 S.E.2d 572, 577-78 (1988), rev'd,

324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
22. Id. at 11, 373 S.E.2d at 578.
23. State ex rel Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 497, 164 S.E.2d 161, 167-68 (1968).
24. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 92 N.C. App. 1, 12-13, 373 S.E.2d 572, 579, rev'd, 324
N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
25. Id at 18, 373 S.E.2d at 582.
26. Id.
dissenting).
27. Id. at 19, 373 S.E.2d at 582 (Becton, J.,
dissenting).
28. See id. at 19, 373 S.E.2d at 583 (Becton, J.,
29. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 379-80, 379 S.E.2d at 34.
30. Id. at 381-83, 379 S.E.2d at 35-36.
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its own facts and found it not inconsistent with the constitutional principal that

judicial authority may be granted to an agency when reasonably necessary to
31
accomplish the agency's purposes.
Having reached the conclusion that the state's constitution permitted

agency discretion in setting penalty amounts, the supreme court next examined
whether discretion is reasonably necessary for the purposes of sedimentation

pollution control. In doing so, it evaluated the purposes of the NRCD as well as
the objectives of sedimentation pollution control. 32 Noting that time is of the
essence in preventing sedimentation pollution, the court concluded that the

power to levy a civil penalty may provide swifter compliance than injunctive

33
remedies sought in courts.
The court then examined the judicial power 34 to be conferred upon the

NRCD, including an assessment of the restraints on that power, in order to
establish the extent of the NRCD's discretion. 35 The court considered the
amount of the penalty (with a fixed ceiling of $100 per day) as well as mandatory

standards for determining what constitutes a violation. 36 The supreme court observed that "plenary guiding standards exist to check the exercise of NRCD
discretion" 37 and noted the five factors 38 that the NRCD considers when assess-

ing the penalty amount. In its analysis, the court also mentioned the availability
39
of numerous grounds for judicial review of the penalty.

The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue of agency discretion to set fines over twenty years ago in State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines. n0 The
court examined a statute that conferred "upon the Commissioner of Insurance a
discretion, subject to no guiding rules or standards, to impose a civil penalty not
in excess of $25,000."41 The statute also gave the Commissioner power to per-

manently revoke the licenses of agents who violated it.42 In determining that the
31. Id
32. Id. at 380-81, 379 S.E.2d at 34-35.
33. Id For a discussion of the hazards of sedimentation pollution, see Brief for Amici Curiae
(North Carolina Council of Trout Unlimited and the North Carolina Wildlife Federation) at 12-13,
In re Appeal (No. 543A88).
34. Judicial power is the ability "to decide and pronounce judgment and carry it into effect" in
contrast to the administrative power to make "provisional decisions of questions of law." I AM.
JUR. 2DAdministrativeLaw § 173 (1962); see also infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing the legislature's ability to grant judicial power).
35. The examination of guidelines is common practice in cases judging the validity of delegation of legislative authority to agencies. See, e.g., Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and
Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 697, 249 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1978) (Constitution does not inhibit
the delegation of legislative authority to Coastal Resources Commission if accompanied by adequate

guiding standards).
36. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 382-83, 379 S.E.2d at 36.
37. Id
38. The five factors consist of the degree and extent of harm caused by the violation, the cost of
rectifying the damage, the amount of money the violator saved by his noncompliance, whether the
violation was committed willfully, and the prior record of the violator in complying with the statute.
Id; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-649(a)(3) (1983) (amended 1989).
39. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 383, 379 S.E.2d at 36.
40. 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968).
41. Id at 488, 164 S.E.2d at 162.
42. Id. at 490, 164 S.E.2d at 163; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-44.6 (1965) (repealed 1983).
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discretion to set the penalty amount was not reasonably necessary to accomplish
the purposes of the Commissioner, the Lanier court emphasized the difference
between the legislature's power to delegate its own authority and the legislature's limited ability to confer judicial authority upon an agency. 43 The court
noted that constitutional issues arise when the legislature attempts to give away
judicial power-power that the legislature itself does not have.44
The court began by stating that the prescription of standards to guide and
confine administrative officers was a delegation of legislative power. Because
judicial powers were at issue, however, the court considered irrelevant the absence of guidelines controlling administrative discretion. The court stated:
[W]e are not here concerned with whether the Legislature has or has
not prescribed standards to guide and confine the administrative officer
in his exercise of the power conferred. With or without standards to
guide the administrative discretion, the Legislature cannot confer upon
an administrative officer judicial power, except
within the limits speci45
fied in Art. IV, § 3, of the Constitution.

Thus, the Laniercourt implied that even if the statute had contained standards
to guide the Commissioner's discretion, it would not necessarily have been
constitutional.
Lanier established a method of examining the necessity of judicial power
without examining limitations that the statute might confer along with the grant
of discretion. The court claimed that an examination of the prescription of standards or limitations included in the statute was not relevant. However, the court
did insist that "the nature and extent" of the discretionary powers of the Com46
missioner should be a consideration in determining their reasonable necessity.
The decision also warranted an examination of the discretion afforded the Commissioner in light of the purpose "for which the agency was established." 4 7
Without elaborating on the extent of power or the purpose of the Commissioner,
the Lanier court then declared that the power to revoke a license, as well as the
power to hold hearings to determine facts relating to violations, were "reasonably necessary."'48 The court, however, did not find reasonably necessary the
"judicial power to impose ...a monetary penalty, varying, in the Commissioner's discretion, from a nominal sum to $25,000 for each violation." 49
Many years later, Lanier guided the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
43. See Lanier, 274 N.C. at 495, 164 S.E.2d at 166.
Strictly speaking, there is no delegation of the judicial power to the Commissioner by this
statute. One delegates his own authorities or powers, not those of another. A branch of
government, like an individual, may not delegate powers it does not have. The legislature
has, however, by this statute, undertaken to confer upon the Commissioner of Insurance a
part of the judicial power of the state. We must, therefore, determine its authority to do so
in the light of the foregoing provisions of the Constitution of North Carolina.

Id.
44. Id. at 496, 164 S.E.2d at 167.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 168.

47. Id.
48. Id. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 167.
49. Id. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 167-68.
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Young's Sheet Metal & Roofing v. Wilkins, 50 in which a truck driver challenged
the authority of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to fine him for exceeding the weight allowed under his license. The statute in question did not
provide a specific penalty for that violation, 5 1 but did provide for penalties for
exceeding maximum axle-weight limits. 5 2 As was the case here, the licensed
weight limit can be less than the axle limit resulting in a violation of the licensed
limit but not of the maximum axle-weight limit. The driver questioned the
DMV's attempt to extrapolate authority to fine for one violation onto a similar
violation that did not include a penalty provision.5 3 Reading Lanier as broadly
objecting to any agency discretion in setting fines, 54 the court struck down the
DMV penalty because allowing it would give the DMV an absolute ability to set
penalties not provided for by statute, which was "even more discretion" than the
supreme court struck down in Lanier.55
The court of appeals again reviewed Lanier in North CarolinaPrivateProtective Services Board v. Gray, Inc.5 6 The defendant in Gray challenged a $2000
penalty for failure to register his employees in violation of chapter 74C, section
17(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes.5 7 The statute grants the Private
Protective Services Board authority to impose a civil penalty not exceeding
$2000 in lieu of revoking or suspending licenses.5 8 Unlike the court in Young's
Sheet Metal, the court of appeals did not interpret Lanier to "mean that all
administrative civil penalties are per se in violation of the State Constitution." 59
The court distinguished the statute in question from the one at issue in Lanier on
the basis that it contained guidelines for setting penalties rather than giving the
60
agency unfettered discretion to set penalties up to a certain maximum.
In In re Appeal the court of appeals objected to the Gray court's method of
distinguishing Lanierbased on the presence of guidelines limiting agency discretion.6 ' The court of appeals applied its narrow interpretation of Lanier because
it refused to distinguish In re Appeal from Lanier based on the difference in
50. 77 N.C. App. 180, 334 S.E.2d 419 (1985), cert. denied, 316 N.C. 202, 341

SE.2d

574

(1986). The superior court in In re Appeal relied on Young's Sheet Metal for its determination that
the "absolute discretion" given to the NRCD by General Statutes § 113A-64(a)(1) was unconstitutional. See In reAppeal, 92 N.C. App. 1, 10-11, 373 S.E.2d 572, 578 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 373, 379

S.E.2d 30 (1989). The North Carolina Court of Appeals subsequently ruled that the statute did not
permit absolute discretion and thus ended the case's reliance on Young's Sheet Metal.
51. Young's Sheet Metal, 77 N.C. App. at 182, 334 S.E.2d at 420 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2096 (Supp. 1974) (amended 1985); ia § 20-118 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
52. I d; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-96 (Supp. 1974) (amended 1985); id. § 20-118 (Cur. Supp.

1981).
53. Young's Sheet Metal, 77 N.C. App. at 181, 334 S.E.2d at 420.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id at 183, 334 S.E.2d at 421.
Id.
87 N.C. App. 143, 360 S.E.2d 135 (1987).
Id at 144, 360 S.E.2d at 136 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-17(c) (1985)).

58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-17(c) (1985).
59. Gray, 87 N.C. App. at 146, 360 S.E.2d at 137.

60. Id at 147, 360 S.E.2d at 138. In addition to setting a maximum penalty of $2000, the
statute requires that the amount of harm be considered in the penalty's assessment and that the
penalty be in lieu of revocation or suspension. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-17(c) (1985).
61. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 92 N.C. App. 1, 18, 373 S.E.2d 372, 382, rev'd, 324 N.C.
373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
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standards included in the statutes-not an unfounded decision in light of the
Lanier court's refusal to consider those factors.6 2 Lanier, after all, claimed to
reach its decision on flexible fines without regard to legislative guidelines or lack
thereof.63 Arguably, the only element of the statute that the Lanier court examined was discretion. However, the Lanier court did not specify whether the
grant of discretion was unnecessary in light of the Insurance Commission's purpose or in light of the extent of the judicial power that discretion represented,
although it mentioned both considerations in its decision." Lanier merely held
that the legislature could not grant the power to set a varying penalty to the
65
Commissioner under article IV section 3 of the North Carolina Constitution,
which mandates the reasonable necessity of judicial powers granted to the executive branch. Disregarding Lanier's failure to explicitly examine the Commissioner's discretion in regard to the factors mentioned, the court of appeals in In
re Appeal insisted that Lanier "permits only the judiciary (rather than the
agency itself) to assess a varying penalty."' 66 The majority did not pay attention

to the few lines in the Lanier opinion that claimed to limit the decision to the

question of the Commissioner's discretion. 67
Though the Lanier court provided the opportunity, the court of appeals did
not distinguish In re Appeal based on the differences in the purposes of the
NRCD and the Insurance Commission. Although the court of appeals briefly
discussed the purposes of the NRCD, 68 it focused more narrowly on the nature
of the power granted the agency. 69 The court of appeals failed to consider that
the Lanier court, though not articulating its analysis, claimed to have reviewed
the power granted the Commissioner in light of the purposes for which the
agency was created; that is, the Commissioner's duty to prevent agent dishonesty. 70 The tendency to read Lanier without focusing on this claim, no doubt
arises from Laniers concern for and emphasis on the type of powers to be
scrutinized.
The difference between the supreme court's interpretation of Lanier and
that of the court of appeals lies in the attention each court paid to the reasoning
process of Lanier.7 1 Unlike the court of appeals, the supreme court did not feel
62. See supra text accompanying note 45. The supreme court in In re Appeal held that the
court of appeals had erred by not following North CarolinaProtective Servs Bd.v. Gray, Inc., which
addressed the same questions raised in In re Appeal. "Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by
that panel unless it has been overturned by a higher court." In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 384, 379

S.E.2d at 37.
63. State ex rel Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 496, 164 S.E.2d 161, 167 (1968).
64. Id. at 496, 164 S.E.2d at 167.
65. Id. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 168.
66. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 92 N.C. App. 1, 18, 373 S.E.2d 572, 582, rev'd, 324 N.C.
373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
67. See Lanier, 274 N.C. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 168.
68. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 92 N.C. App 1, 11-12, 373 S.E.2d 572, 578, rev'd, 324
N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).
69. Id at 12, 373 S.E.2d at 578-79.
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9 (1965) (repealed 1983) (vesting the Commissioner with the
duty of preventing "practice injurious to the public by insurance companies").

71. Some have suggested that the court of appeals in In reAppeal placed too much emphasis on
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obliged to interpret Lanier's holding in light of the five paragraphs explaining
72
why guidelines are irrelevant to the determination of reasonable necessity.

Rather, the supreme court narrowly focused on the holding alone. Considering
the lengthy review preceding the holding as "obiter dicta,"' 73 the supreme court

was able to confine Lanier to its factual situation. Unlike the court of appeals,
the supreme court was attuned to the language of Lanier that stated:

Whether a judicial power is "reasonably necessary as an incident to the
accomplishment of a purpose for which" an administrative office or
agency is created must be determined in each instance in the light of
the purpose for which the agency was established and in light of the
74
nature and extent of the judicial power undertaken to be conferred.

The holding of Lanier further supports the supreme court's conclusion that
Lanier mandates an analysis of agency purpose and the extent of power conferred when it states, "[w]e have before us only the attempted grant to the Commissioner of Insurance the judicial power to impose upon an insurance agent...
a penalty, varying in the commissioner's discretion ....

We hold such power

cannot be granted to him.''75 On the basis of this language, the In re Appeal
court confined Lanier's prohibition of discretion uniquely to prohibit a grant of
discretion to the Commissioner of Insurance. The language shows that the

Lanier decision did not purport to define reasonable necessity of flexible fines in
all situations.
The supreme court's decision to limit the applicability of Lanier is consistent with other North Carolina courts' tendency to allow agencies more discretionary power in recognition of the modem role that agencies serve.7 6 The
supreme court agreed with Judge Becton that "'mechanical application of the
Lanier rule ignores the progress made in the way the role of administrative agencies is regarded.' ",77 Indeed, the legislature's recognition of increased adminisa dangling preposition in the Lanier holding to reach the conclusion that it prohibited any varying
penalty (as opposed to concluding that only penalties varying widely were unconstitutional). See
Brief for Amici Curiae (North Carolina Council of Trout Unlimited and the North Carolina Wildlife
Federation) at 6-7, In re Appeal (No. 543A88). The Amici realized the weakness in an argument
based wholly on rules of grammar as is obvious from their comment, "Although amici run the risk
of treading the slippery slope of 'what ifs' they feel it is interesting to note that one possible explanation for the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in the case sub judice might be the location of
an awkwardly placed prepositional phrase." Id.
72. See State ex rel Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 495-96, 164 S.E.2d 161, 166-67 (1968).
73. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 379, 379 S.E.2d at 34.
74. Id. at 379, 397 S.E.2d at 34 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Lanier,274 N.C. at 497, 164 S.E.2d
at 168).
75. Lanier, 274 N.C. at 497, 164 S.E.2d at 168.
76. "The modem tendency is to be more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to administrative agencies in order to ease the administration of laws as the complexity of economic and govemmental conditions increases [sic]." Commissioner of Ins. v. Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 402, 269
$.E.2d 547, 563 (1980); see also Adams v. Department of Natural and Envtl. Resources, 295 N.C.
683, 697, 249 S.E.2d 402, 410 (1978) ("A modem legislature must be able to delegate-in proper
instances---'a limited portion of its legislative powers' to administrative bodies which are equipped to
adapt legislation 'to complex conditions involving numerous details with which the Legislature cannot deal directly.' "); 1 AM. JUR. 2DAdministrativeLaw § 118 (1951) (discussing modem administrative agencies' need for broad legislative guidelines).
77. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 381, 379 S.E.2d at 35 (quoting In re Appeal From Civil Penalty,
92 N.C App. 1, 20, 373 S.E.2d 572, 583 (1988) (Becton, J., dissenting)).
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trative capabilities has led to increased responsibilities for the agencies. Since
the supreme court decided Lanier in 1968, the state has created more agencies
and given administrators greater authority. 78 This trend is especially true of
North Carolina environmental agencies whose powers of protection have increased in the past two decades in response to the state's increased need to protect "fragile resources."' 7 9 By 1977, growing agency involvement forced the

governor to create the NRCD by joining together the Department of Natural
and Economic Resources, the North Carolina Zoological Park, and the Wildlife
Resources Commission. 0
The supreme court's refusal in In re Appeal to interpret Lanier as banning
flexible fines allows the supreme court to examine statutes using contemporary
criteria.8 1 In its holding, the supreme court in In re Appeal speaks of the constitutionality of administrative agencies' power to exercise discretion. 82 By referring to agencies in general, rather than to the NRCD alone, In re Appeal
establishes that the legislature may confer discretion upon agencies across the
board. A decision limited to the NRCD, or to agencies with purposes similar to
the NRCD, would have left the powers of agencies with different goals in
doubt. 83 Such a decision, which would potentially leave Lanier to govern other
agencies, would have deprived many of those agencies of much of the enforcement power granted to them. Furthermore, such a decision would encourage
the creation of fixed penalties, which often are considered unfair.
Variable fines allow the decision-maker to adjust the penalty according to
the culpability of the offender. 84 A first-time offender may be assessed a small
penalty whereas a frequent abuser of the laws may be subject to higher fines.
Discretion also allows penalties to be proportional to violations. Allowing discretion, however, assumes neutrality on the part of the administrator. If admin-

istrators are biased in favor of the violators, discretion may allow the offenders
to get off with a lower penalty than would a statute with a fixed fine. Concern

that state agencies or commissions may hold biases is not unfounded, especially
in the field of environmental protection where vast differences of opinion exist
85
because of political or business concerns.
78. Daye, North Carolina'sNew Administrative ProcedureAct: An InterpretativeAnalysis, 53
N.C.L. REv. 833, 836 (1975) (describing increase in Agency activity up until 1975).
79. NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL 793 (J. Cheney ed. 1987-88) (history of the NRCD's development in the last decade).
80. Id.
81. The legislature did not enact the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act until 1973. Its purposes are better analyzed using today's criteria than standards that might have been set in Lanier.
See Act to Establish a Program for the Control of Pollution from Sedimentation, ch. 392, § 15(a)(1),
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 476, 483 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-64(a)(1) (1989)).
82. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 384, 379 S.E.2d at 37.
83. See, eg., Brief for Amici Curiae (Carolina Legal Assistance) at 1-3, In re Appeal (No.
543A88) (arguing that the Department of Human Resources would be less able to protect the rights
of nursing home patients if denied the ability to impose flexible fines).
84. See Brief for Amici Curiae (Trout Unlimited and North Carolina Wildlife Federation), In
re Appeal (No. 543A88).
85. See The News and Observer (Raleigh), Sept. 5, 1989, at IA, col. 1 (Environmentalists express concern that the Coastal Resource Commission consists of members of the development
industry.).
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Though In re Appeal permits a grant of discretion to state agencies, it limits
an agency's discretionary power to the ability to determine penalties within an
authorized range. 86 In addition, adequate guiding standards must accompany
the authority. 87 The court does not define, except by example, what will constitute adequate standards and authorized range. The holding of In re Appeal established that discretion is not prohibited by the North Carolina Constitution,
but its obiter dicta could be considered to establish a test for the reasonable
necessity of discretion. The opinion does not clarify whether statutes with different maximum fines or guiding standards would meet this test. For example,
chapter 143, section 215.114(l) of the North Carolina General Statutes gives the
North Carolina Environmental Commission the power to assess up to $5000 a
day for violations of air-quality standards and includes only three factors to
guide the determination of amount. 88 While this statute and the one challenged
in In re Appeal both exist for the prevention of pollution, the amount of fines and
guidelines differ.
Though the case may not clearly establish the constitutionality of statutes
such as section 143-215.114, the danger in explicitly defining "adequate guidelines" or "authorized range" is that courts may declare some statutes unconstitutional on an arbitrary basis when discretion may be necessary for their
purposes. The wiser approach to determining a statute's validity, left available
by the In re Appeal court, is a case-by-case analysis of the challenged discretionary authority.
Future challenges to the holding of In re Appeal may help to clarify the
definition of authorized range and adequate guiding standards. Although the

case provides an opportunity for a challenger to appeal by distinguishing his
statute from chapter 113A, in light of the supreme court's willingness to allow
discretion in In re Appeal, success in limiting the scope of In re Appeal is not
likely.
In re Appeal sets forth little that legislators, administrators, and violators
alike had not assumed already. Nonetheless, the case is important because it
confirms these beliefs. Upheaval of many agencies' means of enforcement would
have occurred had the opinion not made such a declaration. In addition to preserving the status quo, the decision may provide legislators with additional incentives to include checks on discretion when creating statutes authorizing civil
penalties. However, by bringing the issue of constitutionality to attention, the
decision could subject the courts to an increase in challenges based on distinctions between statutes. Thus the true extent of a decision intended to establish
the constitutionality of flexible penalties in general rests on the outcome of challenges that will be based on constitutional issues unnoticed until now.
86. In re Appeal, 324 N.C. at 384, 379 S.E.2d at 37.
87. Id.
88. In determining the amount of the penalty the Commission shall consider the degree
and extent of harm caused by the violation, the cost of rectifying the damage, and the
amount of money the violator saved by not having made the necessary expenditures to
comply with the appropriate pollution control requirements.
N.C. GEN STAT. § 143-215.114(a)(3) (1987 & Supp. 1989).
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When discretion to set the amount of penalties is permitted, discretion to
assess only nominal fines also exists. The latter discretion, amounting to the
ability to allow violators to escape penalties, still may threaten the effectiveness
of many laws. Nonetheless, forbidding discretion of any kind, as the North Carolina Supreme Court no doubt realized, would hamper law-enforcement efforts
far more than it would help them, even considering the problems of dishonesty
inherent in discretionary power. The court could avoid these problems, however, by encouraging the use of guidelines to establish minimum penalties rather
than only emphasizing their use as a means of preventing decision-makers from
over-penalizing. But, despite its inattention to this possible use of guiding standards, the decision is historically well-reasoned and practically astute.
FARLEIGH HAILES EARHART

